![]() ![]() While B-CATT is able to stop all known rowhammer attacks, it does not yet tackle the fundamental problem of missing memory isolation in physical memory. Our first defense, B-CATT, extends the system bootloader to disable vulnerable physical memory.ī-CATT is highly practical, does not require changes to the operating system, and can be deployed on virtually all x86-based systems. Our defenses prevent the attacker from leveraging rowhammer to corrupt physically co-located data in memory that is owned by a different system entity. In this paper, we present the design and implementation of two practical and efficient software-only defenses against rowhammer attacks. To date, there exists no instant protection against rowhammer attacks on legacy systems. Previous proposals on rowhammer mitigation either require hardware changes or follow heuristic-based approaches (based on CPU performance counters). Rowhammer is a hardware bug that can be exploited to implement privilege escalation and remote code execution attacks. ![]()
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